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LOCKOUTS AND REPLACEMENTS IN BARGAINING-
MANAGEMENT ON THE OFFENSIVE
Mob Law at Homestead
Provoked by an Attack of Pinkerton Detectives
Ten Men Killed and at Least Fifty Wounded
Fierce Battles Fought at the Steel Works-The
Detectives Attempt to Land from Boats and are Driven Back and
Held Until they Surrender.*
The use of the lockout' as a bargaining weapon by an employer has
had a relatively restricted history. Since the passage of the National
* Headline account of events following the lockout at the Homestead Steel Works,
N.Y. Times, July 7, 1892, at 1, col. 7.
1. A lockout has been defined at common law as the cessation by the employer of
the furnishing of work to employees in an effort to obtain for the employer more
desirable terms. The term "lockout" has been used in more recent years to denote
a temporary layoff of employees as distinguished from a discharge or severance of
the employment relationship.
Associated Gen. Contractors, Ga. Branch, 138 N.L.R.B. 1432, 1442 (1962). A lockout
does not exist when an employer lays off employees or shuts down the plant when these
actions have no direct relation to unionization or union activities. See, e.g., American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1965). Generally, there are three
reasons related to union activities why an employer might wish to lock employees out:
(1) the desire to frustrate organizational efforts by a union attempting to gain a foothold
in the business or to avoid the duty to bargain with an established union, (2) he might
lockout his employees to put pressure on the union to accept a contract favorable to
himself, or (3) he might lockout his employees in an effort to minimize losses from an
impending strike or other aspect of a labor dispute. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Ga.
Branch, supra at 1442.
The term "offensive lockout" has recently fallen into judicial disfavor due to the
difficulties in ascertaining the motivating force behind the lockout. See, e.g., Inter-
Collegiate Press, Graphic Arts Div. v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974); Laclede Gas Co. v. NLRB, 421 F.2d 610, 615 n.1l (8th
Cir. 1970). In this comment, however, the terms "offensive" or "bargaining lockout"
should be understood to mean those lockouts which are substantially motivated by a
desire on the part of the employer to achieve an advantage in a collective bargaining
situation.
In recent years lockouts have consistently been held not to be in violation of the Act
when motivated by economic considerations in response to a threatened strike, Quaker
State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40, 44 (3rd Cir.) (dicta), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
917 (1959), or when in support of the employer's bargaining position after a bargaining
impasse has been reached. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra at 318. It is now
accepted that lockouts are not illegal per se. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB,
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Labor Relations Act (the Act),2 the primary question answered by the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board) has been whether the
lockout was legal at its threshold. Until recently the Board and the
courts rarely had the opportunity to deal with the employer's use of a
lockout coupled with the use of temporary replacements.8 This bargain-
ing tactic allows the employer to continue operations during the lockout,
placing additional pressures on the employees to accept his demands.
supra at 318; Hess Oil & Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1970); Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 43.
Generally, the key factor in determining the legality or illegality of a lockout has been
employer motivation. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra at 308-09;
NLRB v. George I. Roberts & Sons, 451 F.2d 941, 946 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Bagel
Bakers Council, 434 F.2d 884, 890 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971);
NLRB v. Rubin, 424 F.2d 748, 750 (2d Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Southern Beverage Co.,
423 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1970); Plastics Transp. Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 54, 58 (1971).
However, where the lockout is inherently destructive of protected employee rights, the
Board need not examine the motivation of the employer. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown, 380
U.S. 278, 287 (1965).
Also, a lockout is not illegal if motivated by economic rather than antiunion
considerations. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra at 308, 318; NLRB v.
Brown, supra at 287-88; NLRB v. Drapery Mfg. Co., 425 F.2d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir.
1970); NLRB v. Sun Hardware Co., 422 F.2d 1296, 1297 (9th Cir. 1970) (by
implication); Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208, 1211-12 (D.C. Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Gopher Aviation, Inc., 402 F.2d 176, 183 (8th Cir. 1968); Botsford Concrete Co., 185
N.L.R.B. 804 (1970). This may be true even when the economic conditions to which the
employer is reacting arise out of union activity. See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. NLRB,
supra at 614; Royal Packing Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 148, 81 L.R.R.M. 1059, 1061
(1971), affd by order 86 L.R.R.M. 2571 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 186
N.L.R.B. 440, 450-51 (1970). Lockouts are also recognized as legal if used to advance
the employer's position in a collective bargaining situation. See, e.g., American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra at 313; Local 155, Int'l Molders & Allied Workers Union v.
NLRB, 442 F.2d 742, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1971). On lockouts generally see, Baird,
Lockout Law: The Supreme Court and the NLRB, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 396 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Baird]; Bernhardt,. Lockouts: An Analysis of Board and Court
Decisions Since Brown and American Ship, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 211 (1972) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Bernhardt); Meltzer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows on an Old
Terrain, 28 U. Ciff. L. REv. 614 (1961) fhereinafter cited as Meltzer]; Oberer, Lockouts
and the Law: The Impact of American Ship Building and Brown Food, 51 CORNELL L.Q.
193 (1966).
Offensive lockouts are characterized by
mhe use of a temporary layoff of employees solely as a means to bring economic
pressure to bear in support of the employer's bargaining position, after an impasse
has been reached.
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, supra at 308.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151 etseq. (1970).
3. It has been said that the use of replacements "poses a more serious threat to
industrial peace than does a lockout; the prospect of replacements constitutes, moreover,
a more effective restraint on concerted activities than does a lockout." Meltzer, supra
note 1, at 617.
LOCKOUTS AND REPLACEMENTS
The past decade, however, has seen increasing use of this tactic and an
accompanying increase in the amount of litigation concerning its legality
under sections 8(a)(1) and (3)4 of the Act. These sections provide
that:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in -the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage mem-
bership in any labor organization .... 5
While the language of these sections would appear to be an absolute
prohibition of employer actions having a detrimental effect on the free
exercise of employee rights, the Board and the courts have not adopted
this position. Rather they have interpreted the language of these sections
to require that the employer's conduct, to be found unlawful, must not
only restrict employees in the exercise of the rights granted to them
under the Act, but also must flow from an anfiunion animus.6 This
motivation requirement holds the seeds of an unjust application of the
law as it presently relates to offensive lockouts and temporary replace-
ments.
In American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 7 sections 8(a)(1) and (3)
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1970).
5. Id.
6. This test requires that a requisite mens rea be shown to support a finding that an
individual has violated a particular section of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.
See Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor
Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269, 1273-1314
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Christensen & Svanoe] for an excellent discussion of history
of the use of motive in this context. Christensen and Svanoe suggest that the use of
a motive test "merely obscures" the real policy considerations which form the actual
foundation of many court decisions. Id. at 1325-28.
The Act is designed
Mo eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions... by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and condi-
tions of their employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
An employer's state of mind alone bears little relation to the economic efficiency or
the social utility of his acts. In order to achieve the goals of the Act the employer's
actions rather than his motivation should be examined.
7. 380 U.S. 300 (1965). The employer in American Ship was engaged in the "highly
seasonal business" of operating shipyards on the Great Lakes. Id. at 302. The possibility
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were found not to prohibit the use of a lockout to force union accept-
ance of an employer's bargaining position after a lawful bargaining
impasse had been reached, in the absence of antiunion motivation. 8 On
the same day that the Court decided American Ship it also decided
NLRB v. Brown.9 Brown held that an employer may use temporary
replacements to continue operations during a lockout called in response
to a whipsaw strike.10 The Court expressly reserved, however, the
question of the legality of the use of temporary replacements during an
offensive bargaining lockout."-
At present, two conflicting yet somewhat overlapping tests are being
used by the Board and by the courts to determine if the employers'
actions, in cases in which a section 8(a)(1) or (3) violation is alleged
in the lockout/temporary replacement area, arise from antiunion ani-
mus. The two positions which seem to appear in the cases are (1) the
motivational test, which derives from a questionable interpretation of
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.; 2 and (2) the balancing test,
of a customer's ship being stranded in the yards if the employees went out on a wildcat
strike was the primary concern of the employer. Id. at 303-04. That this was a distinct
possibility was indicated by the fact that a bargaining impasse had been reached in the
contract negotiations and that a similar wildcat strike had occurred in 1961. Id. at 304.
To forestall the concomitant economic loss this would entail, the employer locked out his
employees in the slack season and, as a result, a new contract was agreed upon before the
busy season began. Id. at 304.
8. Id. at 313.
9. 380 U.S. 278 (1965). In Brown an employer bargaining unit composed of five food
stores was engaged in negotiations for a new contract with the Retail Clerk's Union.
During the bargaining the union struck one of the stores and in response to this action
the remaining stores locked out their employees and continued operations through the
use of temporary replacements composed primarily of management personnel and their
families. Id. at 280-81. The Court characterized the employer's action as defensive, Id. at
284, and noted with approval the statement of the lower court that
If.. . the struck employer does choose to operate with replacements and the other
employers cannot replace after lockout, the economic advantage passes to the struck
member, the non-struck members are deterred in exercising the defensive lockout,
and the whipsaw strike... enjoys an almost inescapable prospect of success.
Id. at 285, citing, 319 F.2d 7, 11 (10th Cir. 1963). The courts have not been equally as
eager to apply an "inescapable prospect of success" test when judging the actions of the
employer. Cf. Ottawa Silica, 197 N.L.R.B. 449, affd mem., 482 F.2d 945 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974).
10. Usually the smallest of the group is struck in order to focus the economic
burden of the strike at the weakest point. If successful at this point, successive
strikes follow against other single members of the group until the final goal is ac-
complished.
319 F.2d at 9 n.3.
11. 380 U.S. at 308 n.8.
12. 388 U.S. 26 (1967). The Court in Great Dane examined the actions of an
employer who refused to pay vacation benefits to those who had gone out on strike while
making no such refusal to those who had worked during the strike. Id. at 30.
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proposed by a faction of the Board,13 several commentators,' 4 and some
courts.15 While these two primary poles of thought are identifiable,
neither the courts nor the Board apply the available standards with any
degree of clarity or certainty. Thus, the cases often reflect a somewhat
confused mixing and blending of the various factors which have been
held significant in other cases.
I. GREAT DANE AND AMERICAN SHIP: THE JUDICIAL
REFINEMENTS OF SECTIONS 8 (a) (1) and (3).
The language of Great Dane clearly established two standards by
which the conduct of an employer may be held to be motivated by an
antiunion animus. First, if the employer's conduct is "inherently de-
structive," a violation may be found because the very nature of the
employer's action implies an antiunion animus.16 Second, if the employ-
er's conduct has only a slight effect on employee rights, a violation may
nonetheless be found if the employer fails to come forward with some
evidence of business justification.' 7 The Court in Great Dane stated:
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discrimina-
tory conduct was "inherently destructive" of important employee rights,
no proof of an antiunion motivation is needed and the ,Board can find
an unfair labor practice even if the employer introduced evidence that
the conduct was motivated by business considerations. Second, if the
adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is "com-
paratively slight," an antiunion motivation must be proved to sustain the
charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate and
substantial business justifications for the conduct. Thus, in either situa-
tion, once it has been proved that the employer engaged in discrimina-
tory conduct which could have adversely affected employee rights to
13. See notes 93-107 infra and accompanying text.
14. See Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 6, at 1329-32; Shieber & Moore, Section
8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act: A Rationale-Part 11 Encouragement or
Discouragement of Membership in any Labor Organization and the Significance of
Employer Motive, 33 LA. L. Rav. 1, 27-37 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Shieber &
Moore].
15. See NLRB v. Prescott Indus. Prods. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 10 (8th Cir. 1974) (using a
balancing test in the area of employee free speech: "The employees' rights are to be
weighed against the interests of management in the pursuit of its lawful objectives");
Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (suggesting that the Supreme
Court is moving away from the motivation test).
16. See Baird, supra note 1, at 407-08.
17. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967) (indicating that
the employer's burden is one of going forward with the evidence rather than a burden of
proof).
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some extent, the burden is upon the employer to establish that he was
motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most ac-
cessible to him.'5
It has been said that Great Dane represents a retreat from the high
point of the motivation test as expressed in American Ship.'0 However,
in laying down the standards by which an employer's conduct is to be
tested, the Court did not retreat from the motivation test as much as it
changed the allocation of the burden of proof by requiring the employer
to demonstrate the absence of antiunion motivation in some circum-
stances.
The key question to be asked in applying the test of Great Dane is
how have the courts and the Board interpreted the terms "inherently
destructive," "slight effect," and "business jusification." An assessment
of the first two terms would seem to require an examination of the
relative economic strengths of the parties involved in the labor dispute
before deciding the effect of the employer's action. Indeed, what might
be "inherently destructive" to one union might have only a slight effect
on another. For example, skilled employees who are more difficult to
replace are at less of a disadvantage than nonskilled and easily replace-
able employees. The latter could not long withstand an extended lock-
out. However, in American Ship the Supreme Court laid down a broad
prohibition against the Board taking economic power into consideration:
Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) do not give the 'Board a general authority
to assess the relative economic power of the adversaries in the bargain-
ing process and to deny weapons to one party or the other because of
its assessment of that party's bargaining power. In this case the Board
has, in essence, denied the use of the bargaining lockout to the employer
because of its conviction that use of this device would give the employer
"too much power." In so doing, the Board has stretched §§ 8(a) (1)
and (3) far beyond their functions of protecting the rights of employee
organization and collective bargaining.20
18. 388 U.S. at 34. Great Dane could provide the support for a balancing test as well
as the motivational test. This indicates that the present application of Great Dane as
support for the contention that an unlawful motivation is required to find a violation of
sections 8(a) (1) and (3) may be in error. See, e.g., 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rnv. 213,
221 (1967); 48 B.U.L. REv. 142, 147-50 (1968) (indicating Great Dane combines a
balancing test with a motivational test). See also note 80 infra and accompanying text.
The Great Dane criteria were held applicable to § 8(a)(1) violations in NLRB v.
Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967).
19. See Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Janofsky, New
Concepts in Interference and Discrimination Under the NLRA: The Legacy of Ameri-
can Ship Building and Great Dane Trailers, 70 CoLum. L. REv. 81, 91 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Janofsky].
20. 380 U.S. at 317 (citation omitted). But see Inter-Collegiate Press, Graphic Arts
[Vol. 9
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The Court then stated that the balancing of interests was a function
more appropriately reserved to Congress. 1
11. INLAND TRUCKING, OTTAWA SILICA AND INTER-COLLEGIATE
PRESS: APPLICATION OF GREAT DANE TO THE
LOCKOUT/REPLACEMENT AREA
Perhaps in response to the edict of the Supreme Court in American
Ship, the Seventh Circuit, when faced with a situation which might
have been better resolved by balancing the interests of the em-
ployer against those of the employees, 22 chose instead to embark,
upon a judicial expedition through the employer's mind. Inland Trudk-
ing Co. v. NLRB, 23 involved three employers engaged in the business of
delivering ready-mixed concrete to the construction industry.24 Antici-
pating a strike during their busy season, the employers locked out their
Div. v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 847 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974);
Baird, supra note 1, at 428-30.
21. We are unable to find that any fair construction of the provisions relied on by
the Board in this case can support its finding of an unfair labor practice. Indeed,
the role assumed by the Board in this area is fundamentally inconsistent with the
structure of the Act and the function of the sections relied upon. The deference
owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia which
results in the unauthorized assumption by an agency of major policy decisions prop-
erly made by Congress. Accordingly, we hold that an employer violates neither
§ 8(a)(1) nor § 8(a)(3) when, after a bargaining impasse has been reached, he
temporarily shuts down his plant and lays off his employees for the sole purpose
of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining posi-
tion;
380 U.S. at 318.
22. The ideal balancing test would require the Board to weigh the business justifica-
tion behind the actions of the employer against the impact these actions have on the free
exercise of employee rights. For a discussion of those factors which should be considered
in making this determination, see notes 108-15 infra and accompanying text.
We believe that only employer actions that constitute discrimination and unduly in-
terfere with employee exercise of Section 7 rights are Section 8(a) (3) unfair labor
practices. Further, whether particular discriminatory employer action does or does
not unduly interfere with employee exercise of Section 7 rights can only be deter-
mined by weighing the social utility of the employer's action, its business justifica-
tion, against its social disutility, the resulting interference with employee exercise
of Section 7 rights. When the utility of the action outweighs its disutility, the dis-
criminatory action is lawful; when the contrary is true, the employer's action is held
to "encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" and is thus an
unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a) (3).
Shieber & Moore, supra note 14, at 7.
23. 179 N.L.R.B. 350 (1969), enforced, 440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 858 (1971). See generally 3 Tmx. TEcH. L. Rv. 401 (1972).
Some commentators have suggested that the Board may have applied a balancing test
in Inland. See 85 HARv. L. REv. 680, 685 (1972); 50 TEx L. REv. 552, 556 (1972).
In this comment "motivation test" should be understood to include any balancing which
may take place as a condition precedent to the court's inference of an improper motiva-
tion. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 1, at 407-08.
24. 179 N.L.R.B. at 350.
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employees after an impasse had been reached in the labor negotiations.25
Despite temporary replacements, hired ostensibly to maintain "business
commitments," 26 the lockout failed; the employees returned to work
only to go on strike the next day.1
7
The Board, employing a balancing test, held the employers' actions
inherently destructive of protected employee rights:
2s
[W]here "the employer's action is thus defensive, in response to the em-
ployees' own concerted activity, it cannot be said . . . to be designed
necessarily to destroy the exercise of employees' rights or the capacity
of the union to represent them."
However, where the employer, as here, locks out his employees with
the purpose of forcing them to accede to his terms and at the same time
is able to demonstrate, by continued operation through other employees,
that resistance to the employer's terms, .. .is unlikely of success, .. .
and reemployment can be obtained only by concession to the employer's
terms, ... the almost inevitable, tendency of the employer's conduct
would be capitulation.
29
25. Id. at 352.
26. Id. at 353.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 358.
29. Id. at 357-58 (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
the use of replacements
would not merely pit the employer's ability to withstand a shutdown of its business
against the employees' ability to endure cessation of their jobs, but would permit
the employer to impose on his employees.., the pressure of being out of work
while ["obtaining for himself the returns of con-"] tinued operation. Employees
would be forced, at the initiative of the employer, not only to forego their job earn-
ings, but, in addition, to watch other workers enjoy the earning opportunities over
which the locked out employees were endeavoring to bargain. Permitting an em-
ployer to impose this additional price on the protected right to collective bargaining
would, in our opinion, conflict with the intended scope and content of that right,
as protected in 29 U.S.C. § 157.
440 F.2d at 564.
However, the situation would not be so grim for employees in those states which
provide unemployment benefits to workers expelled from their jobs by an offensive
lockout. CAL. UNnal',. INS. CODE ANN. § 1262 (West 1972) provides:
An individual is not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits, and no such
benefit shall be payable to him, if he left his work because of a trade dispute. Such
individual shall remain ineligible for the period during which he continues out of
work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute is still in active progress in the
establishment in which he was employed.
Although this might appear to foreclose any recovery of benefits by an employee locked
out of his job for any reason, the California Supreme Court has held that the
unemployment insurance disqualificiation applies only when the workers "voluntarily
leave their work because of a trade dispute." Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employ-
ment Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 328, 109 P.2d 935, 940 (1941). Accord, Ruberoid Co. v.
California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 59 Cal. 2d 73, 78, 378 P.2d 102, 105, 27
Cal. Rptr. 878, 881 (1963). The court in the Ruberoid decision found that permanently
replaced striking workers were not voluntarily remaining away from work and, therefore,
[Vol. 9
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The Board concluded that a lockout coupled with temporary replace-
ments would be inherently destructive.30
The Court of Appeals, using a more traditional test, agreed with the
Board's conclusion that the employer's action was in violation of the
Act3' and found it significant that this type of lockout "forecloses the
employees' opportunity to earn without surrendering the corresponding
opportunity of the employer." 2 The court then indicated that even if
the employers' actions were not inherently destructive, the employers
had failed to meet the Great Dane test by failing to establish substantial
business justification.33 The court treated the employers' desire to avoid
a strike during the peak business season as a "preference for a labor
confrontation in May rather than the peak summer period, '3 4 and,
hence, not business justification. 5 The holding of Inland Trucking that
were eligible for unemployment benefits. 59 Cal. 2d at 77, 378 P.2d at 105, 27 Cal.
Rptr. at 881. Thus, the California courts have made it clear that workers who leave their
jobs as casualties of a bargaining lockout will be eligible for unemployment benefits. See,
e.g., Coast Packing Co. v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 64 Cal. 2d 76, 79-
80, 410 P.2d 358, 360-61, 48 Cal. Rptr. 854, 856-57 (1966); John Morrell & Co. v.
California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 254 Cal. App. 2d 455, 461, 62 Cal. Rptr.
245, 248-49 (1967) (lockout following reasonable expectation of strike). But see
Artigues v. California Dep't of Employment, 259 Cal. App. 2d 409, 416, 66 Cal. Rptr.
390, 394 (1968) (holding unemployment benefits unavailable to employees locked out by
a multi-employer bargaining group in response to a whipsaw strike). See also Lewis, The
Lockout Exception: A Study in Unemployment Insurance Law and Administrative
Neutrality, 6 CAL. WESrEN L. REv. 89 (1969).
30. 179 N.L.R.B. at 358.
31. 440 F.2d at 565. The court also denied that either it or the Board had engaged in
a balancing test. Id. at 564.
32. 440 F.2d at 564. But see note 29 supra.
33. Id. at 565.
34. Id.
35. Id. This language was basically a condensation of the Board's position that the
employer had to show some additional business justification beyond the desire for a
favorable bargaining result. See notes 73-80 infra and accompanying text.
The interpretation of "substantial and legitimate business justification" in other cases
lends little aid to the development of a working definition. Compare, Allied Indus.
Workers, Local 289 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (financial hardship is
not substantial business justification so as to avoid paying "accrued vacation compensa-
tion" upon cessation of a union-instigated strike); International Ass'n of Mach. &
Aerospace Workers, Dist. 8 v. J.L. Clark Co., 471 F.2d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 1972)
("[olne business justification now recognized to be 'legitimate and substantial' results
when an employer hires 'permanent replacements' to perform the work of striking
employees"); NLRB v. Jemco, Inc., 465 F.2d 1148, 1154 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1109 (1973) ("[clompany's attempt to set off its legal costs against the
employees' vacation pay did not constitute a legitimate objective as required under Great
Dane"); NLRB v. Duncan Foundry & Mach. Works, Inc., 435 F.2d 612, 619 (7th Cir.
1970) (subsequent finding that the employer was in a poor economic position was not
substantial and legitimate justification for prior discrimination in the form of a denial of
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a lockout coupled with temporary replacements is inherently destructive
did not enjoy even a brief period of acceptance by the Board and the
other circuits, but rather fell victim to the motivation test which had
spawned it. Two recent cases, Ottawa Silica 3 and Inter-Collegiate Press,
Graphic Arts Division v. NLRB,37 have limited the impact of Inland
and clarified the difference between the motivational and balancing
tests as presently applied to the lockout/replacement labor situation.
In Ottawa Silica the employer locked out its employees after a bar-
gaining impasse had been reached, but continued operations using sales
and supervisorial personnel."' The lockout lasted five working days and
the union thereafter filed charges alleging that the employer had violated
sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.3 9 The Board rejected the union's
claim. Two members of the Board, Kennedy and Penello, repudiated the
holding in Inland Trucking and held that the lockout and use of
temporary replacements were not, in all situations, destructive of pro-
tected employee rights.40 Relying on Brown to sanction the use of
lockouts, and American Ship to support the use of replacements, they
reached the conclusion, based on the facts of the case, that there was a
substantial and legitimate business justification for the employer's ac-
tions.
41
Miller, then chairman of the Board,42 came to the same result as
Kennedy and Penello but by a different approach, employing a quasi-
benefits); Pay 'N Save Corp., 210 N.LR.B. No. 46, 86 L.R.R.M. 1457, 1459 (1974)
(fire department order to shut down is substantial and legitimate business justification to
stop operations). If any conclusion at all can be drawn from the above cases it is that no
bright line rule exists delineating the boundaries to the substantial and legitimate
business justification test. It seems instead that the issue is one of the degree of economic
justification.
In Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the court hints that substantial
business justification is a label placed on various economic factors on the employer's side
which outweigh the impact the lockout has on employee rights. "Apparently the em-
ployer must demonstrate that his interest in pursuing the conduct at least balances the
harm inflicted upon the rights of the employees." 418 F.2d at 1211. A use of Great Dane
in this manner would approach the balancing tests discussed later in the text; see notes
90-107 infra and accompanying text.
36. 197 N.L.R.B. 449, affd mem., 482 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 916 (1974).
37. 199 N.L.R.B. 177 (1972), enforced, 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 938 (1974).
38. 197 N.L.R.B. at 452.
39. Id. at 449.
40. Id. at 451.
41. Id. at 450-51.
42. Miller's replacement, Ms. Betty S. Murphy, was confirmed by the Senate on
February 5, 1975. 88 LAB. REL. REP. 113 (Feb. 10, 1975).
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balancing process. While refusing to expressly overrule Inland, Miller
said that the lockout and the use of replacement labor was not per se
destructive in the present context. The thrust of his reasoning in support
of this conclusion emphasized the effect of the employer actions and not
the motivation. First, the employer had used its own non-union em-
ployees as replacements.43 Second, the union had refused to assure the
employer that it would not strike. 4 Third, there was some evidence of
legitimate and substantial business justification.45 Miller qualified his
holding, however, noting that:
I do not intend my conclusions in this case to be understood as sanction-
ing the utilization of temporary replacements, particularly when hired
from the outside, in all permissible lockout situations. Thus to the ex-
tent that my colleagues intend, by their readiness to overrule Inland
Trucking Co., to indicate a contrary view, I would disassociate myself
from their rationale.
46
This singling out of outside replacement labor is difficult to understand.
It would seem that the threat of illegal discrimination would be greater if
inside, nonunion personnel were used, rather than outside help. In such
cases the locked out employees as well as the courts might reasonably
conclude that the employer wished to single out only union members for
43. 197 N.L.R.B. at 451. In American Ship the Court seems to intimate that the use
of in-house nonunion employees might be violative of the act:
*mlt is difficult to understand what tendency to discourage union membership or
otherwise discriminate against union members was perceived by the Board. There
is no claim that the employer locked out only union members ....
380 U.S. at 312. However, in WGN of Colo., Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1972), the Board
found continued operation after an offensive lockout, with employees "not covered by
the expired contract," legal, due to the employer's reasonable expectation of a strike.
44. 197 N.L.R.B. at 451. Regardless of the language in Ottawa it appears that a union
cannot insulate itself from an offensive lockout simply by assuring the employer that it
will be given reasonable notice before the employees go on strike. In Ralston Purina
Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 366 (1973), the union president gave the employer, a manufacturer of
spoilable food products, assurances that the union would give the company twenty-four
hours notice of an impending strike (or more if requested). Kennedy and Penello found
the lockout legal as there was no evidence of antiunion motivation. Miner upheld the
company's lockout and use of replacement labor on the grounds that the impact on
employee rights was outweighed by the interests of the employer. Id. at 366-67.
45. 197 N.L.R.B. at 451. Subsequent Board decisions have made it clear that a
"reasonable apprehension of a strike" will provide the necessary business justification to
support a lockout plus the use of temporary replacements. Ozark Steel Fabricators, Inc.,
199 N.L.R.B. 847 (1972). In Ozark the employees had not taken a strike vote at the
time of the lockout yet the Board still found the requisite apprehension as the negotia-
tions had reached an impasse. Id. at 847. Of course, if the employer had to wait for
a strike vote the use of the offensive lockout would be vitiated as an effective bargaining
weapon. In Ozark, the replacements were management personnel. Id. at 847.
46. 197 N.L.R.B. at 451-52 (citations omitted & emphasis added).
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punishment. On the other hand, if all employees were locked out the
strength of this inference would be lessened as the employees would be
locked out regardless of their union membership. Perhaps Miller was
considering the use of only management personnel rather than the use of
nonmanagement, nonunion workers.
Members Fanning and Jenkins dissented and concentrated on Mil-
ler's reasoning. They criticized Miller's approach and conclusion, find-
ing it inapplicable to the case at hand. First, they reasoned that the co-
ercion of union members is just as great when the employer uses
in-plant personnel as when the employer hires temporary replacements
from the outside.47 They buttressed their reasoning by noting that noth-
ing in Inland Trucking requires a union to provide an employer with as-
surances that it will not strike.48 Additionally, the employer in Ottawa
had assured a client that in the event of a strike he would be able to
maintain deliveries, thus indicating that there was not substantial and
legitimate business justification for the use of the replacement labor.4"
The facts in Inter-Collegiate were similar to those in Ottawa Silica,
except that the employer was engaged in the manufacture of highly
seasonal items, with business reaching full production in the first half of
the year.50 The employer locked out his employees in an effort to
achieve a contract settlement before the peak season arrived. The union
refused to accede to the employer's terms and in response the employer
resumed operations with temporary replacements.5
Inter-Collegiate crystallized the Board Members' positions. Kennedy
and Penello simply stated that, "absent antiunion motivation, which is
not shown here, an employer does not violate Section 8(a)(3) or (1) of
the Act by hiring temporary replacements to continue operations during
an otherwise lawful lockout. '5 2 Miller, on the other hand, took the
opportunity to develop more thoroughly his criteria for judging whether
an 8(a) (1) or (3) violation had taken place. The limits which the
Supreme Court had placed on the Board's exercise of a balancing test in
American Ship, he stated, only applied to those cases in which the Board
was "determining the legality of a lockout as such."58 He then went on
to point out that in Brown, a case dealing specifically with the problem
47. Id. at 453.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 453-54.
50. 199 N.L.R.B. at 182 (trial examiner's decision).
51. Id. at 184 (trial examiner's decision).




of temporary replacements, the Court had "balanc[ed] the impact of
such conduct by the Respondents on possible discouragement of union
membership against the importance and the legitimacy of the objectives
of the employer."54 By this reasoning Miller indicated that he would no
longer rely solely upon a motivation test in the lockout/replacement
area; he would adhere, however, to the motivation test when asked to
determine the legality of a lockout standing alone.5 5 Once again, Fan-
ning and Jenkins dissented arguing that a lockout accompanied by the
use of replacement labor was inherently destructive and that, even if the
secondary test of Great Dane,56 requiring the employer to show lack of
antiunion motivation, were to be applied, there was still no evidence of
substantial and legitimate business justification.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Great
Dane tests and affirmed the Board's findings.58 The court first found
that the employer's conduct was not inherently destructive of employee
rights. 9 Inherently destructive, the court suggested, is "conduct . . .
which creates visible and continuing obstacles to the future exercise of
employee rights."60 Although fifteen employees did not return to work
after the lockout, the court found that the union had experienced no
decline in its ability to represent its members.
61
Three factors influenced the court in this finding:
First, the replacements were expressly hired only for the duration of the
labor dispute, and a definite date was given for their termination even
if the dispute was not resolved. This was communicated to both the
union and the employees. Second, at all times the option was available
to the employees to return to work by simply agreeing to the employer's
terms, which were better than those in the old contract. Third, the em-
ployer had already agreed to continue in effect the union-security clause
from the old contract.
6 2
54. Id. at 177-78.
55. Id.
56. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
57. 199 N.L.R.B. at 180 (Fanning and Jenkins, members, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
58. 486 F.2d at 847.
59. Id. at 845.
60. Id. (footnote omitted).
61. Id.
62. Id. (footnote omitted). As to the first factor, it appears that the use of permanent
replacements would be inherently destructive of protected employee rights. See Bern-
hardt, supra note 1, at 236 n.149 (wherein it is suggested that the use of permanent
replacements would be "clearly coercive").
The observation that the employees could have returned to a better contract presents
19751
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It should be noted that in using these factors, the court was, to a certain
extent, employing a balancing test integrating the specific facts of the
case; but the court made it clear that the purpose behind the examina-
tion was to discover if the "employer's conduct... [had] 'unavoidable
consequences . . .which he must have intended,' "63 thus returning
full circle to the motivation test.
Ill. INHERENT DESTRUCTIVENESS
The courts have generally been loathe to find inherent destructiveness
in the lockout/replacement labor area. Under the view espoused by
Kennedy and Penello, a lockout coupled with the use of temporary
replacements "never creates a violation, assuming that the lockout itself
is proper."64 According to this view, all that need be determined is the
legality of the lockout and the use of replacement labor would have no
effect upon the legality or illegality of the lockout itself. This conclusion
has been reached by a process of legal addition, the validity of which is
open to serious question. First, American Ship is cited for the proposi-
tion that a lockout occurring after a bargaining impasse is not always
destructive. 5 Second, Brown is cited for the proposition that the use of
some difficulties. An apparent increase in benefits may actually be illusory due to
inflation.
The last factor probably indicates that the court thought it significant that a union
security clause existed rather than the alternative interpretation that the court found it
significant that the employer did not attempt to force a relatively inferior contract on the
union.
One problem with using these factors is that they are somewhat redundant as they will
probably be applied by the court in determining whether the employer has breached his
duty to bargain in good faith. In situations where the employer's refusal to bargain in
good faith created an impasse, and there was no immediate threat of a strike, lockouts
have been declared illegal. In NLRB v. Bagel Bakers Council, 434 F.2d 884, 889 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971), the court stated:
Since the lockout in this case was in support of bad faith bargaining and not merely
to bring economic pressure to bear upon a legitimate bargaining position, it falls
outside the conduct protected in American Ship ....
Accord, American Stores Packing Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 620 (1966).
However, it is important to note that even if there is unlawful refusal to bargain, due
to a feigned impasse by the employer, replacement labor during an offensive lockout will
be legal if the employer reasonably believes that it will soon be subjected to a strike; see
Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 811 (1974). It may have been significant in
the Sargent case that the union refused to give the employer a "no-strike commitment."
Id.
63. 486 F.2d at 845, quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963)
(emphasis added). See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
64. Inter-Collegiate Press, Graphic Arts Div., 199 N.L.R.B. 177 (1972) (Miller
concurring), enforced, 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974).
65. Ottawa Silica Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 449 (1972) aft'd mem., 482 F.2d 945 (6th Cir.
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temporary replacements is no more inherently destructive "than the
lockout itself. '66 The argument then concludes that since the two actions
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974).
One of the tests for inherent destructiveness in American Ship is examination of the
employer's action to discover if the behavior "will necessarily destroy the unions'
capacity for effective and responsible representation." 380 U.S. at 309. This standard has
been generally ignored by the courts in favor of a test which places primary emphasis on
the continued existence of the union. Even when the test is used the word "necessarily"
can provide a handy escape device for any court wishing to avoid a result favorable to
the union. In NLRB v. Golden State Bottling Co., 401 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1965), the
employer and the union had reached an impasse after a month of bargaining. The
employer's last contract proposals were narrowly rejected by the union and the next day
the employer instituted a lockout. The lockout had the effect of splitting unit employees
into two opposing camps, those who favored a settlement and those who did not. Id. at
455. The court said:
True, the effect of this lockout was to disrupt the orderly internal functioning of
the union, but this result of an otherwise lawful act cannot make that act an unfair
labor practice. This was not a necessary consequence of the lockout and the em-
ployer's refusal of work did not necessarily destroy the union's capacity for effective
and responsible representation.
mhe union split into two factions and ... one of these factions promptly
backed away from the union's, earlier position and decided to accept the company's
proposal. This seems to us to be simply a possible result of a legal lockout. In
the absence of evidence that the employer was wrongfully motivated in the exercise
of his right to refuse work or that union disruption was a necessary consequence
thereof, we cannot sustain the view that the lockout was an unfair labor practice.
Id. at 457. Thus 'inherently destructive' may be read in two different ways by placing the
unspoken words, ". . . in all cases," or "..-. in this particular case," after the words
"inherently destructive." The court in Golden State chose the former. That this has
strong implications for the use of temporary replacements is indicated by dicta which
said that the employer should have hired temporary replacements. Id. Golden State may
be contrasted with NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) where the court
stated that the employer's action
creates a cleavage in the plant continuing long after the strike is ended. Employees
are henceforth divided into two camps: those who stayed with the union and those
who returned before the end of the strike and thereby gained extra seniority. This
breach is reemphasized with each subsequent layoff and stands as an ever-present
reminder of the dangers connected with striking and with union activities in general.
Id. at 231.
Also, the Court in Great Dane indicated that it was necessary only that the conduct in
question have a "potential for adverse effect" to find an 8(a)(3) violation. 388 U.S. at
35 (by implication). Another less restrictive interpretation of 'inherently destructive' was
set forth in Local 155 Int'l Molders & Allied Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 742
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), which held that
withdrawal of benefits for the purpose of inducing a strike in the slack season is
inherently destructive. The court found it unnecessary for actual harm to occur to the
union in order to make a finding that the employer's action was inherently destructive.
As this court has said, the proper question "is not whether an employee actually
felt intimidated but whether the employer engaged in conduct which may reasonably
be said to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act."
Id. at 747 n.4, quoting, Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 743-44 (D.C. Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
66. Ottawa Silica Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 449, 450, aff'd mem., 482 F.2d 945 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
are not intrinsically destructive when used alone, they are not inherently
destructive when combined. In actuality, however, Brown may not be
validly cited for this proposition, because if Brown had legitimized the
use of temporary replacements with the offensive lockout, the Supreme
Court would not have expressly reserved a decision on the same issue in
American Ship.
67
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Inter-Collegiate is
recognized authority for the proposition that a lockout coupled with
temporary replacements is not inherently destructive. A union attorney
might argue that the employer's action is inherently destructive if one of
the factors considered by the court of appeals in Inter-Collegiate is
absent. 68 But initially one might question the significance of these
factors within the context of present negotiating practices. In Inter-
Collegiate the court stressed the employee's opportunity to return to a
better contract and the existence of a union security clause. 0 However,
these factors exist in the great majority of collective bargaining situa-
tions. 70 The prohibition against hiring permanent replacements is some-
what more significant. Perhaps an analogy might be drawn to the prohi-
bition of hiring permanent replacements for unfair-labor-practice strik-
ers. 7'
IV. SLIGHT EFFECT AND SUBSTANTIAL AND LEGITIMATE
BUSINESS JUSTIFICATION
The second test proposed by Great Dane (requiring an employer to
come forward with evidence of substantial and legitimate business justi-
[rihe fBrown] Court stated that it did not see how the continued operations of
the employers there involved and their use of temporary replacements implied hos-
tile motivations any more than the lockout itself; nor could the court see how they
were inherently more destructive of employee rights.
Id.
Note the distinction between this and the original Brown passage.
In the circumstances of this case, we do not see how the continued operations of
respondents and their use of temporary replacements imply hostile motivation any
more than the lockout itself; nor do we see how they are inherently destructive of
employee rights.
NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 284 (1965) (emphasis added).
As to this argument, it is well to ask "whether the thrust of the National Labor
Relations Act is to prohibit bad thoughts, or to curb the harmful conduct. And if the
latter, are bad thoughts to be held to make harmless conduct illegal?" Christenson &
Svanoe, supra note 6 at 1326-27. See also Koretz & Rabin, The Development and History
of Protected Concerted Activity, 24 SYRAcusE L. REV. 715, 727-28 (1973).
67. 380 U.S. at 308 n.8. See note 80 infra and accompanying text.
68. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
69. See note 62 supra.
70. Cf. 1 BNA COLLECTrE BAR. NEG. & CoNT. 18:903 (1972).
71. See 2 BNA COLLECTivE BAR. NEG. & CoNr. 87:1 (1975).
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fication once a slight effect on the union has been shown)72 has either
been ignored or subverted through an expansive definition of "substan-
tial and legitimate business justification." Members Kennedy and Penel-
lo make little effort to justify their position under Great Dane but they
do quote a somewhat bowdlerized provision from Brown: 'When the
resulting harm to employee rights is thus comparatively slight, and a
substantial and legitimate business end is served, the employers"conduct
is prima facie lawful." 73 This passage differs from that in Great Dane in
that Great Dane requires the employer to come forward with evidence of
business justification.74 Even if the Great Dane test were used, the
employer could never fail to have the requisite business justification in a
lockout/replacement labor situation under the present analysis. The
Board in Ottawa Silica noted:
As stated by the Supreme Court in Brown Food Stores, not only was
the prospect of discouragement of membership comparatively remote,"
but the attempt to remain open for business with the help of temporary
replacements was a measure reasonably adapted to the achievement of
a legitimate end.7
5
Thus, the substantial and legitimate business justification upon which
the employer is allowed to justify his -hiring of temporary replacements
arises out of the employer's initial action of locking out his employees.
The expansion of the Brown doctrine into the area of offensive bargain-
ing lockouts eviscerates the Great Dane test, as the only time the em-
ployer would fail to have the necessary justification after a lockout
would be -where he attempted to remain open for business when it
would be economically more advantageous for him to remain closed. 76
Further, if it is true, as has been suggested,7 r that the second test in
Great Dane represents a retreat from a strict motivational test, then it
would seem clear that the business justification the Court anticipated
is one arising from external economic factors.78
72. 388 U.S. at 317.
73. Ottawa Silica Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 449, 450 (1972), affd mem., 482 F.2d 945 (6th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974), quoting Brown v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 278,
289 (1965).
74. See Janofsky, supra note 19, at 91-94.
75. Ottawa Silica Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 449, 451 (1972) a!f'd mem., 482 F.2d 945 (6th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974).
76. See, e.g., Inter-Collegiate Press, Graphic Arts Div. v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 846
n.14 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974) (noting that "it is unlikely an
employer would hire temporary replacements during an otherwise lawful lockout unless
motivated by business exigencies.").
77. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
78. This is not to say that the external economic factors referred to could not have
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The Board's definition of 'substantial and legitimate business justifi-
cation' corresponds more closely to White's concurrence in American
Ship than to any pronouncement of the full Court. Justice White stated:
if the Court means what it says today, an employer may not only lock
out after impasse consistent with [sections] 8(a) (1) and (3), but re-
place his locked-out employees with temporary help or perhaps perma-
nent replacements, and also lock out long before an impasse is reached.
Maintaining operations during a labor dispute is at least equally as im-
portant an interest as achieving a bargaining victory and a shutdown
during or before negotiations advances an employer's bargaining position
as much as a lockout after impasse.
79
In a footnote, however, the majority specifically stated that this was an
incorrect interpretation of its opinion. 0 Explicitly, therefore, American
Ship is not persuasive authority for the present position of the Board and
courts regarding substantial and legitimate business justification.
V. PROVING MOTIVATION
Although cases subsequent to Great Dane have indicated that the
burden regarding the existence of antiunion motivation shifts to the
employer upon a showing of a slight effect on the rights of employees, 1
their origin in some offensive concerted union activity. Cf. Shieber & Moore, supra note
14, at 60.
79. 380 U.S. at 324-25 (citations omitted).
80. Contrary to the views expressed in a concurring opinion filed in this case, we
intimate no view whatever as to the consequences which would follow had the em-
ployer replaced its employees with permanent replacements or even temporary help.
Id. at 308 n.8. White's interpretation was interposed in his concurring opinion to
illustrate his objections to the majority holding in American Ship and specifically his
objection to the majority's finding that an antiunion motivation must always exist to
support a section 8(a)(1) violation in cases involving less than inherently destructive
conduct. The fact that Stewart, who authored the opinion in American Ship, dissented in
Great Dane, which together with NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967),
represented a reduction in the emphasis placed on motivation, would seem to indicate a
movement toward the position feared by Justice White.
Win NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, which was decided after the Court of Appeals'
opinion in the present case, we held that proof of antiunion motivation is unneces-
sary when the employer's conduct "could have adversely affected employee rights
to some extent" and when the employer does not meet his burden of establishing
"that he was motivated by legitimate objectives." Great Dane Trailers determined
that payment of vacation benefits to nonstrikers and denial of those payments to
strikers carried "a potential for adverse effect upon employee rights." Because "no
evidence of a proper motivation appeared in the record," we agreed with the Board
that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice. A refusal to reinstate
striking employees, which is involved in this case, is clearly no less destructive of
important employee rights than a refusal to make vacation payments. And because
the employer here has not shown "legitimate and substantial business justifications,"
the conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice without reference to intent.
Id. at 380 (citations omitted and emphasis added in part).
81. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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the Board and the courts have adhered to a more restrictive approach,
requiring proof in some direct manner of the existence of an antiunion
animus.
8 2
The problems which might be faced in attempting to directly prove
antiunion motivation are illustrated by NLRB v. Wire Products Manu-
facturing Corp.88 Here the Board found an antiunion motivation based
upon the employer's "tavern tongue-loosened remarks" which followed
the initiation of a lockout and use of temporary replacements by the
company's attorneys. 84 The Board gave great weight to the vitriolic
remarks of the employer which "conditioned the end of the lockout on
the employees' abandoning the Union."'8 5 It would be difficult to find
more direct evidence of illegal motivation, yet on appeal the Seventh
Circuit declined to enforce the Board's order and found instead that
there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of illegal intent as
the decision to lock out was made by the attorneys, not the employ-
er. 6 The statements of the employer following the lockout, the court
said, could not be used to prove "that the lockout was improperly
motivated ab initio."' 7 Thus, it seems, at least in the Seventh Circuit,
that the only way to prove antiunion motivation is through direct
82. Ottawa Silica was the first and only time that Kennedy and Penello attempted to
justify their position using any analysis resembling that mandated by Great Dane. They
have been content in subsequent cases to simply state that absent antiunion motivation. it
is lawful to use replacements during a legal lockout. See, e.g., Ralston Purina Co., 204
N.L.R.B. 366 (1973).
83. 484 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1973), enforcing in part 198 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 81
L.R.R.M. 1075 (1972).
84. 484 F.2d at 765-66.
85. 81 L.R.R.M. at 1078.
86. 484 F.2d at 764.
The substance of the decisions which have occupied the major portions of this study
is illustrative of the great variety of highly important employer and union activity
which now takes place under circumstances which makes proof of actual motive
either artificial or impossible. . . . [L]ockouts . . . involve conduct as to which
the "true" motive of the employer or the union is highly unlikely to have been regis-
tered in a form capable of direct proof. In such instances "motive" must normally
be a matter of speculation.
Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 6, at 1325. However, although motive is almost
impossible to directly prove, the courts have generally held that the Board's choice
between two conflicting views as to the existence of unlawful motive may not be
overturned if supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium,
436 F.2d 45, 48-49 (9th Cir. 1970); Black Hawk Corp. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d 900, 902
(4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971).
87. 484 F.2d at 766. But cf. NLRB v. Southern Beverage Co., 423 F.2d 720 (5th Cir.
1970). In Southern Beverage the court found that the employer's actions subsequent to a
lockout could give "retroactive coloration" to a lockout. The court went on to say that
this "coloration resolved the issue of intent" and that thus there was evidence to support
the Board's findings.
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statements by the instigator of the lockout. This is contrary to the
Supreme Court's position in Great Dane which states that evidence of
antiunion motivation is not vital to a finding of an 8(a)(3) violation:
Since discriminatory conduct carrying a potential for adverse effect upon
employee rights was proved and no evidence of a proper motivation ap-
peared in the record, the Board's conclusions were supported by sub-
stantial evidence, and should have been sustained.88
It thus appears that the courts may be unwilling to follow the Supreme
Court's indication that lessening importance be accorded the traditional
requirement of improper motivation.8 9
VI. BALANCING TEST
The balancing test is gaining support as a viable alternative to the
motivation test presently used,90 and some courts, while paying homage
to motivation, actually apply a hybrid test.91 The Supreme Court's
88. 388 U.S. at 35 (citation omitted). In Ottawa Silica Kennedy and Penello noted in
a footnote that Great Dane
does not constitute a dilution of the principles announced in American Ship Build-
ing and Brown Food Stores. Indeed, there the Court cites with approval its deci-
sions in American Ship Building and Brown Food Stores.
197 N.L.R.B. at 451. But is this an accurate statement? One commentator has said of
Great Dane,
The contours of the applicable rules in such cases has been well outlined only two
years previously in American Ship Building and Brown only to be converted by
Great Dane into an uncertain and ominous state as evidenced by Laidlaw.
Janofsky, supra note 19, at 99. Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369 (1968),
enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), held that failure to come forward with evidence
of substantial and legitimate business justification as required by the second test in Great
Dane renders the employer's conduct inherently destructive. In Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d
1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the court characterizes Great Dane as a retreat from the absolute
requirement of improper motivation imposed by American Ship in those cases involving
less than inherently destructive conduct. Id. at 1211. Accord, NLRB v. Hudson Transit
Lines, Inc., 429 F.2d 1223, 1228-29 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971).
89. It would seem that Great Dane is a return to the earlier position expressed by the
Court in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
We think the Court of Appeals erred in holding that, in the absence of a finding
of specific illegal intent, a legitimate business purpose is always a defense to an un-
fair labor practice charge .... [Specific evidence of such subjective intent is
"not an indispensable element of proof of violation."
Id. at 227 (citation omitted).
1 90. See, e.g., Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1969); But cf.
Comment, Employer Discrimination Under Section 8(a)(3), 5 U. ToL. L. REV. 722, 774
(1974) tlhereinafter cited as Employer Discrimination].
91. See, e.g., sources cited in note 19 supra. See also Christensen & Svanoe, supra note
6, at 1315.
[E]stablishment of motive as the benchmark of the violation has obscured the ac-
tual basis of decision, and the process of decision has been warped by the necessity
to frame results in terms of motive.
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admonition in American Ship that the Board has no power to examine
the bargaining strength of the parties involved 92 is probably the primary
roadblock in the path of a balancing test. Miller avoided this in Ottawa
Silica and Inter-Collegiate by effectively limiting American Ship to its
facts. 3 He pointed out that in Brown, a case in which temporary
replacements were an issue, the Court itself, "engaged in a lengthy
discussion, balancing . . . the discouragement of union membership
against the importance and the legitimacy of the objectives of the
employer."94 Analyzing Inter-Collegiate in this manner, Miller came to
the conclusion that the lockout coupled with the use of temporary
replacements was not per se illegal95 but that a holding of per se
illegality would be contrary to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Brown.90
If .I understand the reasoning of the majority opinion of the Supreme
Court in the Brown case, therefore, it is incumbent upon this Board in
each case involving the use of temporary replacements during an other-
wise legitimate lockout to: (1) Weigh carefully all of the circumstances
in order to determine the extent to which the use of such replacements
has a tendency to discourage union membership, and (2) balance
against our conclusions in that regard the extent to which the use of such
replacements was supported by a legitimate and significant business jus-
tification or, on the other hand, the extent to which antiunion animus
rather than bona fide business considerations motivated the employer's
decision to utilize replacements. 97
It is not clear under this analysis if the lack of antiunion motivation
becomes one of many factors to be balanced against the harm to the
union activities or whether it is an alternative test. The cases subsequent
to Ottawa Silica seem to indicate that it is one of many factors,9"
although Miller never reached a conclusion contrary to that of Kennedy
and Penello who use the motivational test.99 The key factor considered
by Miller in his balancing test appears not to be motivation, but rather
the existence of an extremely competitive market requiring the employer
92. 380 U.S. at 317. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
93. Inter-Collegiate Press, Graphic Arts Div., 199 N.L.R.B. 177 (1972) (Miller con-
curring), enforced, 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974).
94. Id. at 177-78.
95. Id. at 178.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
99. It has been suggested that the proper use of a balancing test would result in the
same conclusions as are now being reached by the Board. See, e.g., Shieber & Moore,
supra note 14, at 61.
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to continue production. 100 Correspondingly, if the employer is engaged
in the manufacture of perishable goods,' 0' or if a probable strike will
eliminate a substantial portion of the company's revenue, 0 2 these reali-
ties will also weigh in favor of the employer.
The balancing test thus has not eased the Board's burden in proving
an 8(a)(1) or (3) violation because the words "legitimate and signifi-
cant business justification" in the balancing test have been interpreted in
the same manner as "substantial and legitimate business justification" in
the motivation test. In Inter-Collegiate, Miller defended his use of
Brown in finding business justification. Though Brown involved an em-
ployer response to a whipsaw strike, this made no "significant differ-
ence in [his] analysis."'
10 3
While it is true that, unlike Brown, Respondent was not seeking to pro-
serve the integrity of a multiemployer bargaining unit, . . . the realistic
fact is that the real meaning of preserving that integrity is the mainte-
nance of maximum employer economic strength in dealing with a union
across the bargaining table. . . . I see, therefore, no basis for deciding
that the instant Employer's interest in maintaining its economic viability
was any less justifiable a business consideration than the desire of Brown
Food Stores to maximize its economic strength in bargaining by main-
taining a solid bargaining front with other companies in its industry.1
0 4
This argument overlooks the fact that the desire to maximize economic
strength has no correlation with an action's legality or illegality under
sections 8(a)(1) and (3). If an employer fires key union employees,
certainly the desire to maximize his bargaining power vis-a-vis the union
does not shield his actions.10 5 There appears to be another difference
between a whipsaw strike and a normal bargaining situation. One might
paraphrase the language in Inland Trucking and say that a whipsaw
strike forecloses the employer's opportunity to earn without surrendering
the corresponding opportunity of the employee.'0 6
100. See Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 811 (1974); Inter-Collegiate
Press, Graphic Arts Div. v. NLRB, 199 N.L.R.B. 177, 179 (1972), enforced, 486 F.2d
837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974).
101. See Ralston Purina Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 366 (1973).
102. See WGN of Colo., Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 1053 (1972).
103. Inter-Collegiate Press, Graphic Arts Div. v. NLRB, 199 N.L.R.B. 177, 179
(1972), enforced, 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974).
104. Id. However, one of the most telling arguments for the respondent in the Brown
case was that during a whipsaw strike the employers were, in effect, "subsidizing" the
strike against themselves. Brief for Respondent at 11, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1974).
-106. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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There has been little discussion in the lockout replacement labor
cases about the effect the employer's actions have upon thq union
activities of the employees. Most cases concentrate on the business
justification aspect of the balancing test and neglect that part of the test
dealing with discouragement of union membership.
10 7
VII. CONCLUSION
If the balancing test does become the accepted method for deciding
cases, then the Board should deal with the following considerations.
1. The legality of the lockout should not determine the legality of
temporary replacements. To say that the impact on the free exercise of
employee rights is not changed when the employer adds the use of
temporary replacements is to ignore both industrial reality and expressed
Congressional purpose.108 For this reason, the replacement question
should be examined independently.
2. In determining the legality of temporary replacements, the Board
should give substantial weight to the competitive posture of the employ-
er only if he is one of a few union employers in a primarily non-union
industry. Absent preferential union treatment, the fear of permanent loss
of customers to competitors0 9 would seem to be exaggerated as those
competitors would be subject to the same union pressures.
3. Perhaps under certain circumstances, such as where perishable
goods are involved,"10 the Board should examine how extensively tem-
porary replacements are used. If used only to prevent an unusual
economic loss (that is, an excessive loss that one would not ordinarily
find in a collective bargaining situation) the use of temporary replace-
ments would be easier to justify.
4. Reasonable anticipation of a strike alone should not permit the use
of temporary replacements. As employees have the right to strike,"' the
economic strength of the parties involved should be examined. Here
there is great potential for the employer's action to restrain employees
in the exercise of this right. 12 Thus, for a small union in a highly
seasonal industry, a strike during that period of time might be the only
107. See note 35 supra.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1974). See also, Shieber & Moore, supra note 14, at 26-27.
109. Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 811, 818 (1974) (administrative
judge's opinion).
110. Ralston Purina Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 366 (1973).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
112. See e.g., Shieber & Moore, supra note 14, at 7-12.
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bargaining weapon the union possesses. If the employer locks out prior
to the busy season and hires temporary replacements, the union is left
with two unpalatable alternatives. One is to remain on strike until the
busy season begins and hope that the temporary replacements have not
been trained to a level of full productivity, and the other is to accede to
the employer's demands. The former alternative is one that few unions
would gamble on, especially those representing unskilled labor. There-
fore, the practical result would be stripping the union of its effective-
ness, under color of law.
5. The source of the replacements is another factor which the Board
should consider when weighing the impact of replacements on employee
rights. 113 It has been suggested' 14 that the continuation of operations
with non-union unit employees might have a more serious effect on the
exercise of employee rights than the use of outside replacements. This is
especially true when the only thing which separates the workers is
membership in the union.
6. The serious impact of having to forego income while the employer
continues to make money can be considerably lessened by the availabili-
ty of state unemployment compensation.115 Similarly, the existence of a
union security clause should be another factor considered to lessen the
impact on employees, although it probably should not be given as n'uch
weight as it has in previous cases. Generally, the existence of a union
security clause insures the continued existence of the union, but does not
insure the continued effectiveness of union representation. The danger
of an adverse effect on the free exercise of employee rights can still exist.
Perhaps a valid basis exists for the statement that the use of tempo-
rary replacements is no more illegally motivated than the lockout pre-
ceding the replacements. Even if the statement is true, it is irrelevant.
The purpose of the Act is not punishment of culpable employers or
113. See also 50 TEXAS L. Rnv. 552, 558 (1972).
114. See note 65 supra.
115. The following states allow unemployment compensation to offensively locked out
employees: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1105(f) (1960); California, CAL.
UNEMPLOYMNT INS. CODE § 1262 (West 1956); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-73-
109(1) (1973); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7508(3), as amended §
718(f)(b)(3), as amended § 31-236(3) (1972); Kentucky, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
341.360(1) (1972); Maryland, MD. ANN. CoDE ART. 95A § 6(e) (1969); Michigan,
Mc . STAT. ANN. Sup,. § 17.531(g)(I) (1974) (as interpreted); Minnesota, MNN.
STAT. ANN. SUPP. § 268.09(5)(a) (1974); New Hampshire, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
282: 4F(3) (1966); Ohio, OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(1)(a) (Anderson




unions; the Act is not a criminal statute, but rather an administrative
tool.1 " As an administrative agency, the Board should be concerned
more with effect than intent. It seems that the Act was designed in part
to provide for the exercise of employee rights." 7 To ignore the impact
that the offensive lockout coupled with temporary replacements has
on these rights would be to exalt the state of the employer's mind over
the state of labor-management relations.
Robert S. Musa
116. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1970).
117. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
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